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The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: 
Why Title III of the JOBS Act Fails to Fulfill the 
Promise of Crowdfunding 
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act1 
(“JOBS Act”) in 2012, the topic of “crowdfunding” has garnered 
significant public attention.2  However, some confusion surrounds its 
definition and exactly how it may be used to raise money for a particular 
idea, project, or business.3  The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
crowdfunding as “[t]he practice of funding a project or venture by raising 
money from a large number of people, each of whom contributes a 
relatively small amount, typically via the Internet.”4  For instance, 
websites such as GoFundMe.com and Kickstarter.com provide Internet 
platforms for people to raise funds for their projects without actually 
giving up any ownership stake in the venture.5 
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
2. See Laura Montini, Crowdfunding’s Popularity Surged in 2013 (Infographic),
INC.COM (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.inc.com/laura-montini/the-rapid-rise-of-
crowdfunding.html (illustrating the large amount of growth in the “crowdfunding,” not used 
in the securities sense, realm from $1.5 billion in 2011 to $5.1 billion in 2013). 
3. See Hallie Davison, The Q&A: Perry Chen, Kickstarter, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 22,
2010, 4:48 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/prospero/2010/10/crowd-funding_art (“I 
wonder if people really know what the definition of crowd-funding is.  Or, if there’s even an 
agreed upon definition of what it is.  We haven’t actively supported the use of the term because 
it can provoke more confusion.”). 
4. Crowdfunding, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE
(3d ed. 2015), 
http://www.oed.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/429943?redirectedFrom=crowdfundin
g&. 
5. Congress and the SEC recognize this definition and have passed legislation and
sought to implement rules to integrate the sale of private securities through an online 
intermediary so that the “crowd” might have an equity stake rather than solely making 
donations.  See Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66429 (Nov. 5, 2013) (discussing the 
need for a registration exemption for the online sale of securities to make offerings less costly 
and capital more accessible to small businesses); see also Our Rules, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (noting that projects 
“can’t offer financial incentives like equity or repayment”); How It Works, GOFUNDME.COM,
https://www.gofundme.com/tour/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (indicating that the site allows 
users to “easily accept donations”). 
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Building on the concept of crowdfunding as a means to raise 
capital for a project, Congress designated Title III of the JOBS Act (“Title 
III”) as the CROWDFUND Act, or Capital Raising Online While 
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012, which set 
the foundation for equity or securities crowdfunding.6  On October 30, 
2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted a final 
rule that, once effective, will allow companies to issue securities through 
crowdfunding.7  As written, the rule will allow for the sale of qualified 
securities valued at or below $1 million and will exempt such securities 
from registration with the SEC, a departure from the Securities Act of 
1933 rule.8 
President Barack Obama described the purpose of the JOBS Act 
when he signed the bill into law on April 5, 2012: 
[F]or start-ups and small businesses, this bill is a potential
game changer.  Right now, you can only turn to a limited
group of investors—including banks and wealthy
individuals—to get funding.  Laws that are nearly eight
decades old make it impossible for others to invest. . . .
6. JOBS Act § 301 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Under
Section 2(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, security is defined as: 
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”, or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to
or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).  Securities or equity crowdfunding allows an investor to 
purchase an equity stake in the issuer’s business.  Stay Cowley, S.E.C. Gives Small Investors 
Access to Equity Crowdfunding, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/business/dealbook/sec-gives-small-investors-access-
to-equity-crowdfunding.html?_r=0. 
7. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding: Proposes Amendments to Existing Rules to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional 
Securities Offerings (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html. 
8. See Jobs Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012) (requiring any sale or offering of
securities to be registered with the SEC unless provided by a certain exemption). 
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Because of this bill, start-ups and small businesses will 
now have access to a big, new pool of potential 
investors—namely, the American people.  For the first 
time, ordinary Americans will be able to go online and 
invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.9 
Moreover, the JOBS Act required the SEC to revise existing 
rules, known as Regulation D and Regulation A, to expand the 
exemptions from registration.10  The new rules revising Regulation A 
have been dubbed “Regulation A+.”11  The SEC has also adopted a final 
rule for Title III crowdfunding.12  These changes have greatly expanded 
the options and methods to raise capital via “regulation crowdfunding” 
or “securities crowdfunding” for private businesses, now allowing the 
average American to gain equity interest.13 
One expert has praised the recent growth of unregistered private 
securities offerings to non-accredited investors14 as a “glorious 
democratization of the private capital markets,”15 but in actuality, 
offerings to non-accredited investors have been relatively nonexistent.16  
Although Title III of the JOBS Act promotes investment from average 
Americans, the incentives for start-ups and emerging businesses to raise 
9. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill Signing (Apr.
5, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/remarks-president-jobs-
act-bill-signing. 
10. JOBS Act §§ 201, 401, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(b), 77d.  See also Press Release, Stephen
Fincher, U.S. Representative, House of Representatives, Fincher, Cantor Tout Broad Support 
of JOBS Act (May 7, 2012), http://fincher.house.gov/press-release/fincher-cantor-tout-broad-
support-jobs-act (including commentary from primary sponsor Rep. Fincher). 
11. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital: New Rules Provide Investors With More Investment Choices 
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html; see also infra Part III 
(discussing Regulation A+ at length). 
12. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, & 274). 
13. David M. Freedman, Everything You Need to Know About Securities Crowdfunding,
AIMKTS, (July 1, 2015), http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/article/everything-you-
need-to-know-about-securities-crowdfunding/. 
14. An accredited investor is defined as a variety of investment companies, and any 
natural person whose individual net worth exceeds $1,000,000, excluding a primary 
residence, or if he or she has an income in excess of $200,000 over the past two years or a 
joint income with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2015). 
15. Freedman, supra note 13.
16. VLADIMIR IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ECON.
& RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS
USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 2009-2012, 7 (2013). 
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capital in this manner are marginal.17  Crowdfunding will likely be a 
viable capital raising method in limited circumstances, such as when a 
small business wants to turn its customers into investors, for both the 
benefits of added publicity and the provision of additional capital.18  
Further, Title III may prove useful for issuers who are too small to attract 
institutional or angel investors,19 and may be a more appealing 
investment for current and potential customers.20  However, this is not for 
all start-ups and most companies seeking capital will likely find more 
practical avenues for raising it elsewhere. 
This Note evaluates the existing securities regulation exemptions 
available to businesses.  More importantly, this Note explores how 
Congress could further democratize access to capital markets by 
addressing the holes left in the current crowdfunding regime by the 
Regulation D, Regulation A+, and Title III exemptions.  Specifically, this 
Note discusses the pros and cons of each type of offering and what might 
be done to harmonize the differences to decrease regulatory compliance 
costs and to increase investment from ordinary Americans. 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part II examines the role of 
Regulation D in securities offerings and analyzes the most recent changes 
to the rules.21  Part III looks at Regulation A+ and discusses how these 
17. See Robert B. Robbins & Amy Modzelesky, Can Regulation A+ Succeed Where
Regulation A Failed?, THE AM. L. INST. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., 7 (May 7, 2015) 
(comparing Regulation A to other methods of raising capital); see also David Katz, JOBS Act 
Rules Could Spawn Headaches as Well as Capital, CFO (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://ww2.cfo.com/capital-markets/2015/11/jobs-act-rules-spawn-headaches-well-capital/ 
(“Crowdfunding, which for the first time allows internet issuers to offer equity to investors, 
‘isn’t for everybody,’ says Alex Castelli, a partner and co-leader of the national liquidity and 
capital formation advisory group at CohnReznick, an accounting firm”); Rory Eakin, The 
JOBS Act Is Progress But Much Remains To Be Done, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 29, 2015), 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/29/the-jobs-act-is-progress-but-much-remains-to-be-done/ 
(stating that “[a]s the rules are currently written, the hoops that companies will have to jump 
through will be far too burdensome”). 
18. Katz, supra note 17.
19. “Angel investors invest in early stage or start-up companies in exchange for an equity
ownership interest.”  Richard Harroch, 20 Things All Entrepreneurs Should Know About 
Angel Investors, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 12:22 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2015/02/05/20-things-all-entrepreneurs-should-
know-about-angel-investors/#6a855354483a.  One need only be considered an accredited 
investor to participate in angel investing, but one prominent New York angel investor 
recommends that an angel “need[s] at least $500,000 to invest a minimum of $25,000 across 
20 deals.”  Paul Sullivan, Billions Not Required for Angel Investing, N.Y. TIMES: YOUR 
MONEY (May 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/03/your-money/angel-investors-
need-a-high-risk-tolerance-not-billions.html?_r=0. 
20. Katz, supra note 17.
21. See infra Part II.
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rules have altered the market thus far.22  Part IV critiques the new rules 
provided by Title III.23  Part V offers suggestions on how to amend the 
JOBS Act in order to make the existing exemptions more appealing to 
potential issuers and increase the availability of investment opportunities 
to the average, non-accredited American investor and concludes that 
these rules have failed to accomplish the goal of the JOBS Act.24 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF REGULATION D
EXEMPTIONS FOR PRIVATE SECURITIES OFFERINGS 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, any sale or offering of 
securities must be registered with the SEC or must qualify for an 
exemption from registration.25  Regulation D provides such an exemption 
for the sale of private securities to raise capital for businesses.26  Although 
companies relying on Regulation D need not register their offering of 
securities with the SEC, they must file a “Form D,” which identifies the 
issuer of the securities, the issuer’s address, the issuer’s industry, and 
other simple information.27  Rules 504, 505, and 506 of Regulation D 
provide the categories for exemption from the registration 
requirements.28  This Note will focus on Rule 506,29 as it was utilized by 
ninety-four percent of all securities offerings through Regulation D 
between 2009 and 2013.30 
There are two core facets of Rule 506 that make its safe harbor 
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“Jobs Act”) § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
The Securities Act of 1933 requires that companies disclose important financial information 
to the SEC in an effort to protect investors, mainly from deceit, misrepresentation, and fraud.  
Fast Answers: Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2011).  In general, the 
information that must be provided includes: (1) a description of the company’s properties and 
business, (2) a description of the security to be offered for sale, (3) information about the 
management of the company, and (4) financial statements certified by independent 
accountants.  Id. 
26. 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 (2015).
27. Form D: Notice of Exempt Offerings of Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2016); Fast Answers: 
Regulation D Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/regd.htm 
(last modified Oct. 28, 2014). 
28. 17 C.F.R. §§  230.504–06.
29. § 230.506.
30. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 16, at 7.
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provision for the private offering exemption under Section 4(a)(2) of the 
Securities Act especially attractive to issuers.31  First, Rule 506 allows an 
issuer to raise an unlimited amount of funds through the sale of 
securities.32  Second, Rule 506 offerings are exempt from state “Blue 
Sky” registration laws,33 unlike offerings made under Rules 504 and 
505.34  These unique characteristics allow issuers to raise the largest 
amount of capital with the least amount of regulatory oversight.35  The 
value attributed to the preemption of state laws and regulations is 
evidenced by the fact that while nearly two-thirds of Regulation D issuers 
could have extended offerings under Rule 504 or Rule 505, the vast 
majority instead chose to utilize Rule 506.36  The amount of capital raised 
under Regulation D offerings continues to be large and is steadily 
increasing—$863 billion in 2011, $903 billion in 2012, $1.029 trillion in 
2013, and $1.332 trillion in 2014—and of this amount, ninety-nine 
percent has been raised under 506 since 2009.37 
31. See Yelena Barychev, The Alphabet Soup of Raising Capital: Regulation A or
Regulation D – What Would You Prefer?, BLANK ROME, LLP: SECURITIES NEWS WATCH (Apr. 
22, 2015), http://securitiesnewswatch.com/2015/04/22/the-alphabet-soup-of-raising-capital-
regulation-a-or-regulation-d-what-would-you-prefer/ (“Rule 506 of Regulation D is one of 
the most widely used capital raising exemptions under the US securities laws.  The main 
reason of its popularity is its flexibility. . . . Rule 506 does not have any caps on the dollar 
amount that can be raised. . . . The biggest downside of Regulation A+ structure is that blue 
sky registration requirements are not preempted for Tier 1 offerings . . . [s]uch preemption 
exists for Rule 506.”). 
32. § 230.506.
33. See Fast Answers: Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last modified Oct.14, 2014) (explaining that each 
state has their own set of securities laws and regulations—known as “Blue Sky Laws”—that 
are “designed to protect investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities” and 
typically require greater disclosure to investors and governmental agencies). 
34. Rules 504 and 505 are subject to state registration laws, and are limited to $1 million
and $5 million respectively.  § § 230.504–06.  Furthermore, Rule 504 (the issuance of 
restricted securities) allows for an unlimited amount of non-accredited investors, and Rule 
505 allows for the participation of thirty-five non-accredited investors.  Id.; § 230.144(a)(3); 
see Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm (last modified Jan. 16, 2013) (describing 
what constitutes a restricted security and the sales that produce restricted securities).  An 
additional “sophistication requirement” is placed upon non-accredited investors partaking in 
private placements under Regulation D.  They must “ha[ve] such knowledge and experience 
in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the 
prospective investment” or be represented by a “purchaser representative” that fits this 
qualification.  § 230.506. 
35. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 16, at 7.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 3; see also SCOTT BAUGUESS, ET. AL., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF 
ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009-2014, at 11–12 (2015) (discussing the 
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Despite the prevalence and ease of conducting Rule 506 
offerings, a major downside exists from the perspective of the average 
investor, due to the barrier to entry for those without accreditation.  Of 
the two available exemptions under Rule 506, 506(b) offerings are 
limited to only thirty-five non-accredited investors38 and 506(c) offerings 
are exclusively limited to accredited investors.39  These limitations 
prevent the average American from participating in the vast majority of 
such investment opportunities.40  As of 2013, only twelve million 
households qualified as accredited investors in the United States,41 and of 
these, only about 300,000 actively invest in small business start-ups, 
usually as angel investors.42  Form D filings report that in 2012, out of an 
estimated 234,000 investors who participated in Regulation D offerings, 
only ten percent of offerings included a non-accredited investor.43  In 
2014, only eight percent of Regulation D offerings included non-
accredited investors.44  The mean number of investors per offering 
between 2009 and 2014 was fourteen; however, the median number of 
investors per offering was only four, indicating that a small number of 
offerings involved a large number of investors.45  This goes to show that 
although there are millions of investors, few take part in private securities 
offerings.46  By passing the JOBS Act, Congress hoped to “reopen[] 
American capital markets to emerging growth companies.”47 
prominence of Regulation D). 
38. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2015).
39. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) § 201(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2))
(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c); 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1) (2015). 
40. See IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that “non-accredited investors
were present in only 10% of Regulation D offerings” in 2012).  It should be noted that the use 
of a “purchaser representative,” such as a financial advisor or broker, may only be used to 
satisfy the sophistication requirement imposed on non-accredited investors participating in 
Rule 506(b) offerings, and may not be used to circumvent the accreditation requirement for 
any other Regulation D offering.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h)(i); see Investor Bulletin: Private 
Placements Under Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html. 
41. RACHITA GULLAPALLI, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF ECON. & RISK ANALYSIS,
ACCREDITED INVESTOR POOL: FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION (Nov. 20, 
2014), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/sbforum112014-gullapalli.pdf. 
42. FAQs for Angels & Entrepreneurs, ANGEL CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/faqs/#How%20many%20angel%20investors%20are
%20there%20in%20the%20U.S.?.  (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
43. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 16, at 3.
44. BAUGUESS, ET AL., supra note 37, at 34.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“Jobs Act”), Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 2, 126
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Additionally, to raise awareness of investment opportunities, 
Congress instructed the SEC, via Title II of the JOBS Act, to revise the 
Regulation D rules to permit “general solicitation” or “general 
advertising” if the offering is solely extended to accredited investors.48  
This alteration is reflected in the “new” Rule 506(c).49  The ability of 
issuers to advertise is unprecedented, and is very appealing to companies 
considering which avenue of investment to pursue.50  However, if issuers 
do opt to utilize the Rule 506(c) general advertising provision to recruit 
investors, the JOBS Act requires that the issuer take “reasonable steps to 
verify that purchasers of securities sold . . . are accredited investors.”51  
The SEC determined that such reasonable steps include requesting proof 
of income, bank statements, and consumer reports, or other measures to 
verify investors’ statuses.52  The availability of general solicitation may 
facilitate increasing investors’ attention, but data has shown that 
companies are hesitant to utilize the tool and instead have continued to 
rely on the traditional method of raising capital via Rule 506(b) 
offerings.53  Since Rule 506(c) became effective on September 23, 2013, 
its offerings accounted for only 2% of capital ($33 billion) raised in all 
Regulation D offerings.54  Though new options are becoming available, 
the data collected by the SEC suggests that Regulation D, specifically 
Rule 506(b), will continue as the favored exemption of small businesses 
looking to raise capital.55 
Accordingly, although the general public may become more 
aware of investment opportunities, the ability to invest in such offerings 
is still restricted to the small number of Americans that are accredited 
investors under Rule 506(c).  In this respect, the amendment to Rule 506 
Stat. 306 (2012) (designating Title I as “REOPENING AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS TO 
EMERGING COMPANIES”). 
48. JOBS Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).
50. Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of the
JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-
solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act/. 
51. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).
52. § 230.506(c).
53. Online Deal Marketing Outlook for Q2 2014: Regulators Rain on Parade as Rule
506(c) Enthusiasts Ready for Storm of Advertising, DEALFLOW.COM (April 2014), 
https://dealflow.com/whitepapers/Dealflow_White_Paper_Q1_2014.pdf. 
54. BAUGUESS, ET AL., supra note 37, at 2.
55. Id.
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did little to actually democratize access to capital, and instead merely 
allowed issuers to solely solicit accredited investors.  Nevertheless, 
despite the allowance for non-accredited investors to participate in 506(b) 
offerings, the overwhelming majority of issuers decline to do so. 
III. THE “NEW” REGULATION A+ IS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
TOWARDS REACHING THE ENTIRE CROWD 
Title IV of the JOBS Act contained a mandate to the SEC to 
expand Regulation A to promote “small company capital formation.”56  
On March 25, 2015, the SEC adopted modifications to Regulation A, a 
current exemption from registration for smaller offerings of securities, 
now referred to as Regulation A+.57  The modifications went into effect 
on June 19, 2015,58 and, thus far, have garnered a fair amount of positive 
attention.59  The promulgation of the new modifications illustrates an 
attempt to revamp Regulation A, in light of the historical underutilization 
of these types of offerings since the introduction of the Regulation D 
exemption in 1982.60  The “old” Regulation A was often overlooked as a 
means of raising capital for two main reasons: (1) the prohibitively high 
cost of preparing documents for SEC review, and (2) the requirement to 
comply with state “Blue Sky” laws.61  Between 2012 and 2014, only 
56. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“Jobs Act”) § 401, 15 U.S.C. 77c(b) (2012).
57. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Adopts Rules to Facilitate Smaller
Companies’ Access to Capital: New Rules Provide Investors With More Investment Choices 
(Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-49.html. 
58. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 75 Fed. Reg. 21806, 21806 (Apr. 20, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, & 260). 
59. Amy Wan, An Analysis of the First Approved Real Estate Crowdfunding Regulation
A+ Filing, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2015, 11:06 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/09/74256-an-analysis-of-the-first-approved-real-
estate-crowdfunding-regulation-a-filing/ (“Since the SEC announced the intent to implement
the new Regulation A+ rules in March, there’s been a lot of hype around the potential for
Regulation A+. . . . Since March, I’ve been hearing from crowdfunding attorneys that they’ve
been getting calls on a daily basis from sponsors and companies eager to take advantage of
the new offering mechanism allowed under Regulation A+.”).
60. Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 17, at 1; see also Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner,
Helping Small Businesses and Protecting Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 25, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/helping-small-businesses-and-protecting-
investors.html (discussing why there has been a reduction of Regulation A offerings). 
61. Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 17, at 1; see also Aguilar, supra note 60
(suggesting the reduction in Regulation A offerings may be attributed to the emergence of 
Regulation D as the preferred method for raising capital, as well as the monetary limitations 
and the burdens of blue sky law compliance imposed by Regulation A). 
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twenty-six Regulation A offerings were qualified.62  The amendments 
made to Regulation A were made with these concerns in mind.63 
Prior to the announcement of the final rule, Regulation A 
provided an exemption from the registration requirements of Section 5 of 
the Securities Act for private offerings up to $5 million.64  Title IV of the 
JOBS Act drastically expanded this limit to $50 million.65  To comply 
with its mandate, the SEC established two tiers under Regulation A, each 
with their own respective limit and requirements. 
In order to conduct a Regulation A+ offering, the issuer must be 
a U.S. or Canadian business and have its principal place of business 
within either of those countries.66  Tier 1 allows issuers to offer and sell 
up to $20 million in securities over a 12-month period in a public offering 
with not more than $6 million of securities to be purchased by affiliates 
of the issuer.67  Tier 2 allows issuers to offer and sell up to $50 million in 
securities over a 12-month period in a public offering with not more than 
$15 million of securities to be purchased by affiliates of the issuer.68  
These offerings may be advertised freely and, in contrast to Regulation 
D, are not subject to limitations on the number of non-accredited 
investors that may participate.69  Tier 2, however, does impose a limit on 
the amount that non-accredited investors may invest; they may only 
invest up to ten percent of their annual income or net worth, whichever is 
greater.70 
The most substantial differences between Tiers 1 and 2 are the 
regulatory compliance and reporting requirements.71  Tier 1 is subject to 
state reporting and registration requirements, whereas Tier 2 is exempt 
from state “Blue Sky” laws.72  Tier 1 issuers do have one remarkably 
62. Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 17, at 1.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“Jobs Act”) § 401, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012).
66. 17 C.F.R.§ 230.251.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.; § 230.255 (permitting issuers to solicit interest and “test the waters” before
qualification of the offering by the SEC). 
70. § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C).
71. See § 230.257 (outlining the regulatory requirements for the different tiers under
Reg. A). 
72. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 75 Fed. Reg. 21806, 21856–62 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230).
2016] CROWDFUNDING UNDER THE JOBS ACT 449 
large advantage, though, as they are only required to submit an exit 
report, while Tier 2 issuers are required to provide audited financial 
statements, annual reports on Form 1-K, semi-annual reports on Form 1-
SA, current event reports on Form 1-U, and exit reports on Form 1-K or 
1-Z.73
There are various benefits associated with Regulation A+, 
particularly the availability of investment opportunities to the “entire 
crowd,” as opposed to only accredited investors.  Regardless, this 
singular incentive is unlikely to usurp the role of Regulation D in private 
securities offerings, as the cost of regulatory compliance (state 
compliance for Tier 1 and regular, ongoing reporting for Tier 2) is 
prohibitively high for most start-ups and small businesses.74  The SEC 
estimates that it will take approximately 750 hours to prepare the filings 
for SEC approval under Regulation A+,75 making it unlikely that 
Regulation A+ will become the preferred method of raising capital 
instead of Regulation D.  Therefore, the non-accredited, ordinary 
American investor is unlikely to see more investment opportunities in the 
private securities market through Regulation A+ offerings.76 
Nevertheless, the Regulation A+ market still offers some promise 
for the ordinary U.S. investor.  Regulation A+ has prompted many 
companies to “test the waters”77 by utilizing online, intermediary 
platforms.  For example, StartEngine.com provides an Internet platform 
service to gauge interest in various companies seeking to make a public 
offering under Tier 2 of Regulation A+.78  On June 19, 2015, Elio Motors’ 
“test the waters” campaign went live; between their opening and 
November 3, 2015, Elio Motors received $43,636,350 from 11,326 “non-
binding indications of interest,” $18,636,350 over its goal of 
$25,000,000.79  On August 28, 2015, Elio Motors announced that it filed 
73. § 230.257.
74. Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 17, at 7.
75. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 75 Fed. Reg. 21806, 21889 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
76. See Robbins & Modzelesky, supra note 17, at 7 (“We believe that it is likely that
Regulation A+ will be used not as a standard method of capital-raising, but as a special 
solution to particular situations.”). 
77. § 230.255.
78. What You Need to Know: Reg A+ and the StartEngine Process, STARTENGINE,
https://www.startengine.com/how (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
79. Elio Motors, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/startup/elio-motors (last
visited Jan. 10, 2016).  See also Elio Motors Launches Crowdfunding Investment Opportunity: 
2012 JOBS Act Regulation A+ Allows Non-Accredited Investors to Buy in to Private 
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its offering statement with the SEC seeking authorization to make a 
formal securities offering.80  On November 20, 2015, Elio Motors 
received qualification from the SEC to conduct a Regulation A+ offering 
of 2,090,000 shares.81 
Furthermore, XTI Aircraft company, another company listed on 
StartEngine.com, received $13,443,604 in indications of interest between 
August 25 and November 3, 2015.82  On January 21, 2016, XTI Aircraft 
opened a 30-day window for interested parties to purchase its shares 
following the SEC’s qualification of its offering.83  XTI hopes to sell $3 
million worth of shares, at $10 per share, to meet its minimum offering 
amount.84  However, the realization rate of turning expressed interest into 
actual securities purchases has yet to be determined, and neither Elio 
Motors nor XTI has publicly released the amount of shares currently 
purchased.85  Elio Motors and XTI Aircraft Company’s activities 
illustrate a company’s ability to take a conceptually appealing product 
and utilize the functionality of Tier 2 of Regulation A+ to gauge investor 
interest, and ultimately fund that idea. 
Tier 1 of Regulation A+ is also being used, but with little success.  
On August 31, 2015, GroundFloor, a peer-to-peer microlending real 
estate company, was the first company to qualify for a Regulation A+ 
platform offering.86  After originally being warned by its attorneys that 
Companies, PR NEWSWIRE (June 19, 2015), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/elio-
motors-launches-crowdfunding-investment-opportunity-2012-jobs-act-regulation-a-allows-
non-accredited-investors-to-buy-in-to-private-companies-300101631.html (discussing the 
excitement surrounding the passage of Regulation A+ and the accompanying investment 
opportunities in private companies, particularly Elio Motors). 
80. Elio Motors, Facebook Page, https://www.facebook.com/ElioMotors (last visited
Jan. 10, 2016). 
81. Notice of Qualification for Elio Motors, Inc. Regulation A Offering, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N: EDGAR (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1531266/999999999415000008/9999999994-15-
000008-index.htm; Elio Motors, Inc., Offering Circular (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://startenginebetadev.s3.amazonaws.com/form_1_a/55809f54613164000300018e/Offer
ing_Circular_11-20-15.pdf. 
82. XTI Aircraft Company, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/startup/xti (last
visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
83. XTI Aircraft, Facebook Page (Jan. 21, 2016, 6:15 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/xtiaircraft. 
84. XTI Aircraft, Offering Circular (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://startenginebetadev.s3.amazonaws.com/form_1_a/55d2bf2773652d59247e0000/XTI_
Form_1-A_-_1-20-16_AW-SPH.pdf. 
85. E-mail from Rich Jones, Senior Account Executive, Forty-Seven Communications,
to Max Isaacson (Jan. 8, 2016; 01:30 PM) (on file with author). 
86. Wan, supra note 59.
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the approval process would be quite long and costly, and that it still may 
not be approved by state regulators, GroundFloor proceeded with a 
Regulation A+ offering.87  150 pages of attorney-drafted disclosures were 
needed for SEC approval of Form 1-A.88  Nick Bhargava, co-founder of 
GroundFloor, originally estimated that the total cost of going through the 
North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”)89 
review and SEC review of the filings would be close to $200,000.90  It 
took GroundFloor about five months from the date of its first filing to 
receive approval from the SEC under Tier 1.91  In reality, the process was 
even longer as GroundFloor was likely compiling its offering documents 
since roughly April 2014.92  Even more astounding, the initial public 
offering was limited to a mere $545,000 worth of securities, the proceeds 
of which were used to finance seven loans to property developers.93  
According to GroundFloor’s disclosures, it spent $30,000 on auditing 
fees, $458,000 in legal fees, and $6,000 in state regulatory compliance 
fees or “Blue Sky” fees.94  Thus, GroundFloor spent nearly the amount 
they were seeking in capital on the initial offering itself.  This illustrates 
the severe downside of Tier 1 offerings and casts significant doubt on the 
advantage and practicality of a Tier 1, Regulation A+ public offering. 
Notably, in regard to mandatory disclosures, Congress requires 
that issuers utilizing Regulation A+ file annual audited financial 
statements, leaving the SEC without any regulatory leeway.95  However, 
Congress gave the SEC the authority to include whatever other rules they 
found necessary to promote the “public interest and [] the protection of 
investors.”96  To this end, Congress ensured certain restrictions would be 
87. Teri Buhl, First Reg A Issuer to Complete State Review Process Would Do It Again,
4 GROWTH CAPITAL INVESTOR 1 (2015) (Reprinted by SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT,
MITCHELL & JERNIGAN, LLP), http://www.smithlaw.com/updates-alerts-629.html. 
88. Id.
89. The North American Securities Administrators Association provides a “Coordinated
Review Program for Regulation A Offerings” that is “designed to facilitate the filing of 
Regulation A offerings in multiple U.S. jurisdictions.”  Regulation A Offerings, N. AM. SEC.
ADMIN. ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corporation-finance/coordinated-
review/regulation-a-offerings/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2016).  The Review Program aims to 
expedite the approval of state filings of securities offerings.  Id. 
90. Buhl, supra note 87.
91. Wan, supra note 59.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 401(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2) (2012).
96. Id.
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placed upon offerings, while granting the SEC greater discretion to 
implement its own restrictions.  In light of these initial Regulation A+ 
offerings, Congress should revisit Regulation A and relax the onerous, 
demanding regulations that deter potential issuers from choosing 
Regulation A as their preferred method of private securities offerings. 
IV. TITLE III OF THE JOBS ACT: AN ATTEMPT TO LET ORDINARY
AMERICANS GET A BITE AT THE APPLE 
Unlike Regulation D and Regulation A+, Title III of the JOBS 
Act is specifically designed to provide a modus to “crowdfund,”—that is, 
provide an avenue by which small businesses can raise a relatively small 
amount of money through the online sale of securities to a large number 
of investors without excessive costs.97  The SEC announced a set of 
proposed rules on December 18, 2013,98 which were met with great 
excitement by the public.  Almost two years later, the SEC adopted the 
final rule on October 30, 2015.99  Notwithstanding the SEC’s delay in 
finalizing the rules under Title III of the JOBS Act, many states took the 
initiative to pass intrastate crowdfunding bills in the meantime.100  There 
97. See JOBS Act §§ 301–305 ((codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
(allowing private businesses to raise funds from non-accreditted investors, with limitations, 
online). 
98. Press Release, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase Access
to Capital for Smaller Companies (Dec. 18, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540518165. 
99. Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
100. Although this note focuses on interstate, federal crowdfunding, the intrastate
crowdfunding exemption movement should not be overlooked.  As of September 23, 2015, 
sixteen states and the District of Columbia have fully enacted some form of intrastate 
crowdfunding; nine states have passed legislation but have yet to finalize intrastate 
crowdfunding rules; twelve states have crowdfunding legislation pending, and three states are 
considering whether to adopt intrastate crowdfunding measures.  Sec. Exch. Comm’n Comm. 
Small & Emerging Cos., Recommendation to Modernize Rule 147 under the Securities Act of 
1933, Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-
rule-147-recommendation-draft.pdf; Anya Coverman, State Crowdfunding Update, Nat’l 
Conference State Legislatures (2015), http://nasaa.cdn.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Intrastate-Crowdfunding-Overview-2015.pdf.  The typical 
“intrastate exemption” provided by states allows a company to sell securities to all investors, 
not only accredited investors, within that particular state’s boundaries.  David M. Freedman, 
Everything You Need to Know About Securities Crowdfunding, AIMKTS (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/article/everything-you-need-to-know-about-
securities-crowdfunding/.  Many of these state exemptions include limits on investments 
made by non-accredited investors.  Id.  Furthermore, intrastate issuers are severely restricted, 
in that the current SEC Rules require a business to only conduct business in that particular 
state to qualify for the safe harbor exemption under Rule 147.  17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015).  
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has also been ongoing Congressional discussion about a new proposal to 
fix past issues with the JOBS Act, which may ultimately alter Title III 
once more.101 
A. Title III Extends Investment Opportunities to the Ordinary, Non-
Accredited American Investor
For the first time in over eighty years (since the passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933), ordinary Americans will be able to passively 
invest in private business via securities.102  The final rule pursuant to Title 
III will allow any investor, accredited and non-accredited alike, to 
purchase unregistered securities from issuers utilizing Internet-based 
platforms, commonly referred to as funding portals.103  As noted, prior to 
these rules, those wishing to invest in private securities had to be a 
qualified institutional buyer or an accredited investor.104  If not, the 
offering had to be limited to thirty-five total non-accredited investors per 
offering, or had to be within the boundaries of a single state.105  Once the 
final rule becomes actionable, private companies may seek financing 
from ordinary Americans without registering the offering, so long as 
Therefore, in order for a business to utilize intrastate crowdfunding, they must pass a strict 
percentage threshold test, that mandates a business: (1) derive at least 80 percent of their 
revenues in the given state; (2) maintain at least 80 percent of their assets in that state; and, 
(3) use at least 80 percent of the offering’s gross proceeds in that state.  Id.; see also Tony
Zerucha, Exclusive: Title III on its way?, BANKLESS TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015, 9:45 AM),
http://www.banklesstimes.com/2015/09/24/exclusive-title-iii-on-its-way/ (discussing
intrastate crowdfunding “tests” and requirements).  The SEC Advisory Committee noted,
“These tests are difficult to satisfy and render many contemporary small businesses seeking
local financing ineligible to rely upon the rule.”  Sec. Exch. Comm’n Comm. Small &
Emerging Cos., Recommendation to Modernize Rule 147 under the Securities Act of 1933,
Sec. Exch. Comm’n 1 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-rule-
147-recommendation-draft.pdf.  Hence, amongst other recommendations, the Advisory
Committee encouraged the SEC to eliminate these limits to allow more small businesses and
investors to participate in in-state crowdfunding.  Id.  Furthermore, the SEC proposed rules to
ease intrastate and regional securities offerings on October 30, 2015.  Crowdfunding, 78 Fed.
Reg. 66428 (Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249).
101. JD Alois, When Will Crowdfunding Arrive? “Very Near Term”, CROWDFUND 
INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2015, 10:46 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/09/74928-
when-will-retail-crowdfunding-arrive-very-near-term/. 
102. Georgia Quinn, Title III Crowdfunding: Talking About a Revolution, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 12:32 PM), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/76506-title-
iii-crowdfunding-talking-about-a-revolution/. 
103. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71537 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 227.100).
104. Quinn, supra note 102.
105. Id.
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certain disclosures and procedures are followed.106  Nevertheless, 
although the option is there, it remains unlikely that Title III will become 
a preferred capital raising method amongst most private companies.107 
B. The $1 Million Limitation on Title III Offerings Severely
Restricts its Practicality
The new rules will allow an issuer to offer up to $1 million in 
unregistered securities within a 12-month period.108  Congress placed 
limitations on the aggregate amount that potential non-accredited 
investors may purchase; investors with an annual income or net worth 
less than $100,000 are permitted to invest $2,000 or the lesser of five 
percent of their annual income or net worth.109  Investors with an income 
or net worth of greater than $100,000 are permitted to invest the lesser of 
ten percent of their income or net worth.110  Moreover, there is a cap on 
all investors, limiting their total investments to $100,000 over a 12-month 
period.111 
The $1 million limit is relatively low considering the amount of 
capital sought by most start-up companies.  In the fourth quarter of 2014, 
the average and median seed deal sizes were $1.9 million and $1.7 
million, respectively.112  This goes to show that many companies, 
specifically those within the software and biotechnology industries, need 
substantially more capital than $1 million.113  Thus, companies may be 
106. Id.
107. See Tanya Prive, Why Title III of the JOBS Act May Be a Flop, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2015,
8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2015/11/03/why-title-iii-of-the-jobs-act-
may-be-a-flop/ (discussing the various reasons why Title III may not emerge as useful for 
raising capital as hoped by Congress). 
108. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. 77b-c (2012).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 2014 Was a Giant Year for Seed VC Funding, CB INSIGHTS (Jan. 15, 2015),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/seed-venture-capital-2014/.  Seed stage funding has been 
defined as “[t]he first stage of venture capital financing.  Seed-stage financings are often 
comparatively modest amounts of capital provided to inventors or entrepreneurs to finance 
the early development of a new product or service.”  CFA Level 1: Alternative Investments – 
The Stages in Venture Capital Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/exam-
guide/cfa-level-1/alternative-investments/venture-capital-investing-stages.asp (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2016). 
113. Frank Vinluan, Equity Crowdfunding Backers Clash Over Fundraising Limits in
States, XCONOMY (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.xconomy.com/national/2015/04/01/equity-
crowdfunding-backers-clash-over-fundraising-limits-in-states/. 
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forced to resort to parallel or multiple offerings in order to meet their 
capital needs through Title III; however, this strategy will likely be cost 
prohibitive.114  The capital limitation placed on Title III crowdfunding 
has been described as “an unnecessary restriction on a company’s ability 
to grow.”115  On the other hand, others have argued that small businesses 
and seed-stage firms will not be hindered by the monetary limitation, as 
Title III provides an investment gap-filler for many smaller entities in 
need of only a couple hundred thousand dollars.116  Still, the limitation 
impairs the utility of Title III more than all of the prior discussed capital 
raising methods, such as Regulation D, which has no limitation, and Tier 
2 of Regulation A+, in which a company may raise $50 million from non-
accredited investors in a “mini-IPO.”117 
C. Title III Imposes a Complex Regulatory Scheme that Constrains
its Viability as an Attractive Means to Raise Capital
Despite Congressional efforts to revolutionize the securities 
market, the regulatory scheme surrounding Title III is expansive and 
challenging.118  Importantly, Title III preempts state registration and 
“Blue Sky” laws, which will result in meaningful cost savings, but 
nevertheless, companies wishing to utilize Title III will still be subject to 
significant disclosure under federal law which is will be quite 
expensive.119  The rules require an issuer to disclose a substantial amount 
of information to the SEC through Form C.  This includes: information 
about officers, directors, and owners of twenty percent or more of the 
issuing entity; a description of the issuer’s business and how the proceeds 
of the offering are to be used; the price of the offered securities and how 
that price was calculated; the target offering amount, the deadline for the 
114. See Prive, supra note 107 (noting that multiple offerings may be cost prohibitive
whereas other offering methods could raise a larger amount of capital in a single offering). 
115. Vinluan, supra note 113.
116. Id. (“But Bill Warner, an angel investor and co-founder of EntreDot, a Research
Triangle Park, NC-based organization that supports entrepreneurs, says crowdfunding is 
intended for small businesses and seed-stage firms, which have the hardest time securing 
financing.”). 
117. See id. (discussing the caps placed on offering methods, with one angel investor
describing them as “an unnecessary restriction on a company’s ability to grow”). 
118. Robert Robbins, Practical Implications of the JOBS Act Changes to Private
Placements: Rule 506(c), Crowdfunding, and Reg A+, 5, THE AM. L. INST. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC. 4–5 (Mar. 19, 2015). 
119. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. 77b-c (2012).
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target, and whether or not funds will be accepted in excess of the target; 
certain related-party transactions; a discussion of the issuer’s financial 
condition; and, most importantly for considering the cost of an offering, 
the financial statements of the issuer.120  The proposed rules differ from 
the final rule in that the final rule will allow the issuer to complete Form 
C through an optional, user-friendly “Q&A” format, which is intended to 
help reduce the amount of time and expertise needed to complete the 
document.121 
Depending on the offering, different standards apply to the 
financial statements that must be disclosed.  For issuers offering $100,000 
or less in securities, a disclosure of the issuer’s total income, taxable 
income and total tax, as reflected in its federal income tax returns certified 
by its principal executive officer must be filed.122  If the offering is greater 
than $100,000 but not more than $500,000, the issuer must provide 
financial statements that have been reviewed by an independent, certified 
public accountant.123  For first time crowdfunding issuers making an offer 
between $500,000 and $1 million, financial statements reviewed by a 
public accountant will also suffice.124  However, if the issuer has 
previously sold securities via regulation crowdfunding, it must provide 
audited financial statements from an independent certified public 
accountant.125 
The alteration between the proposed rules and the final rule that 
relaxes the examination requirement of financial statements is somewhat 
significant for potential issuers, but not enough to incentivize the use of 
Title III over Regulation D, or even Regulation A+.126  By allowing 
issuers to more easily fill out Form C, they will save some money and 
time, but hardly enough to make a Title III offering the most attractive.127  
120. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71538 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 227.201).
121. Id. at 71398 (“We believe that this optional [Q&A] format should help reduce the
burden on crowdfunding issuers of preparing disclosures.”). 
122. If financial statements of the issuer are available that have been reviewed or audited
by an independent public accountant, those financial statements must be filed.  Id. at 71412. 
123. But, if the issuer has financial statements available that have been audited by an
independent public accountant, those statements must be provided.  Id. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Prive, supra note 107 (discussing four hurdles that Title III imposes, including:
(1) the $1 million limitation, (2) the cost of regulation compliance, (3) the creation of messy,
extensive capitalization tables, and (4) the other more cost-effective means to raise capital).
127. Id.
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Filing Form C with the SEC still may be costly and time consuming—the 
SEC estimates that the average cost of the preparation and filing of Form 
C is $6,000, which some say is an underestimation—a burden that many 
small businesses may not be able to handle.128  The elimination of the 
audited financial statements requirement for first-time issuers is 
undoubtedly the most noteworthy, as it will save an estimated $10,000 to 
$40,000 for these issuers.129  The SEC has estimated that ongoing 
disclosure costs will range between $1,667 for offerings of $100,000 or 
less, to $13,333 for offerings nearing $1 million.130  However, others have 
dismissed the SEC’s estimations as egregiously low, suggesting that 
actual ongoing annual report costs will range from $7,000 to $25,000 per 
year, which can be offset through other means of raising capital, such as 
Regulation D.131 Moreover, a significant cost—ranging from several 
hundred to several thousands of dollars per issuer—is imposed to conduct 
investigations on issuers’ directors and officers to ensure that no “bad 
actors” are involved in the business.132  Lastly, the online “funding portal” 
or broker-dealer will take a fee in accordance with the funds raised, which 
might range between ten and twenty percent.133  Adding all these costs, 
an issuer seeking to raise $100,000 in securities will likely pay at least 
$17,967.134  The costs associated with a Title III offering add up quickly, 
and when compared to those required by a Rule 506 offering, they are 
dauntingly large.  In the words of a New York Times writer, “a company 
hoping to raise $100,000 could end up paying more for the capital than it 
128. Id.; Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66521 (Nov. 5, 2013).
129. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71499–500 (Nov. 16, 2015).  See Brent Johnson,
Should You Pay for Audited Financial Statements?, THE BUS. OWNER J. (2016), 
http://www.thebusinessowner.com/business-guidance/accounting/2009/07/should-you-pay-
for-audited-financial-statements (exploring the various criteria of financial statements and 
whether or not paying top dollar for audited financial statements is worth it, if it is not required 
by law). 
130. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71500 (Nov. 16, 2015).
131. See Prive, supra note 107 (examining the costs imposed on businesses by Title III
reporting requirements). 
132. Kendall Almerico, Has The SEC Made Equity Crowdfunding Economically
Unfeasible?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/11/26291-sec-made-equity-crowdfunding-
economically-unfeasible/. 
133. Id.
134. Taking into consideration the lowest estimates of each cost results in $17,967 for a
$100,000 offering: $6,000 for filing Form C; $1,667 for ongoing disclosure; several hundred 
dollars ($300 here, hypothetically) for “bad actor” certifications, and varying a ten percent fee 
for an offering.  See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71499-500 (estimating the offering costs 
for issuers). 
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would by borrowing the money with a credit card.”135 
Moreover, Title III imposes an enormous burden on online 
funding portals and intermediary broker-dealers as is required under 
Section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933.136  The SEC estimates that the 
initial cost for an entity to register as a broker and become a member of 
a national securities association, in order to engage in crowdfunding 
activities, will be roughly $275,000, with an annual cost of $50,000 
required to maintain the registration and membership.137  Additionally, 
the SEC estimates the cost of meeting the various requirements that apply 
to registered brokers will be $245,000 initially, and $180,000 annually.138  
If an entity registers solely as a funding portal and registers with a 
member of a national securities association the estimated cost is $100,000 
initially, with an annual cost of $10,000.139  Notably, these costs are 
merely for registration and membership and do not account for 
development and implementation of the platform.140  In total, the SEC 
estimates that the initial cost to become an intermediary broker will be 
$945,000, with an ongoing annual cost of $315,000.141  For an 
intermediary registering as a funding portal, the initial cost is estimated 
to be $592,000, with an ongoing annual cost of $135,000.142  In addition, 
the cost of conducting background checks on issuers is estimated to result 
in approximately $13,818 to $34,546 per intermediary per year.143  
Intermediaries are also required to produce a series of educational videos 
to be shown on their portals, which is estimated to cost $10,000 per 
intermediary per year, with an initial cost between $10,000 and 
$30,000.144  Ultimately, even more money will be spent complying with 
disclosure and ongoing reporting requirements, as other regulatory 
135. Robb Mandelbaum, What the Proposed Crowdfunding Rules Could Cost Businesses,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov.14, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/what-the-
proposed-crowdfunding-rules-could-cost-businesses/?_r=0. 
136. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1 (2012).
137. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71509 (Nov. 16, 2015).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The SEC estimates that the cost to develop a platform, for an “average intermediary”
will cost approximately $425,000 initially with an ongoing annual maintenance cost of 
roughly $85,000 per year.  Id. 
141. Id.
142. Id. at 71510.
143. Id. at 71513.
144. Id. at 71529.
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authorities begin to implement their own rules.145 
D. The Prohibition on Advertising and General Solicitation
Dramatically Reduces the Attractiveness of Title III Offerings
Lastly, the advertising restrictions required by Title III are a 
serious impediment to notifying the average American that such 
investment opportunities exist.  Interestingly, solicitation and advertising 
are very restricted in comparison to Regulation D and Regulation A+ 
offerings.146  Direct communication between the issuer and the potential 
investor is extremely limited.147  An issuer may only post notices similar 
to “tombstone ads,” which may only direct a potential investor to the 
funding portal on which the offering is listed and provide basic, factual 
information about the business and offering, including the amount of 
securities offered, the nature of the securities, the price of the securities, 
and the closing date of the offering period.148  Furthermore, the funding 
portals will not be able to market specific offerings, but rather only their 
own services.149  Thus, as one expert acknowledges: 
145. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) proposed a rule to adopt its
own Funding Portal Rules, in addition to those of the SEC, on October 9, 2015.  80 Fed. Reg. 
66368 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“All funding portal members of FINRA will be subject to these [SEC] 
rules if they are adopted by the SEC. Further, as discussed earlier, FINRA is proposing 
specified conduct and compliance rules, also aimed at investor protection.”).  FINRA has 
included in its rule change a streamlined process for entities to exist solely as funding portals, 
rather than also functioning at registered brokers.  Id. at 66369.  FINRA estimates that abiding 
by FINRA rules alone, and not registering as a broker-dealer with the SEC will still cost 
between $100,000 and $150,000 annually, in compliance costs alone.  Id. at 66366 
(acknowledging that firms that offer full private placement platform brokerage services for 
accredited investors may have multiple full-time compliance officers and spend $100,000 to 
$150,000 annually on ensuring regulation compliance).  See also Almerico, supra note 132 
(estimating the costs associated with complying with regulations promulgated by the SEC and 
FINRA). 
146. Douglas S. Ellenoff, Making Crowdfunding Credible, 66 VANDERBILT L. REV. EN 
BANC 19, 24 (2013). 
147. Section 302(b) of the JOBS Act adds a “new” Section 4A to the Securities Act of
1933, “Requirements with Respect to Certain Small Transactions,” which provides, amongst 
other requirements, that an issuer shall “not advertise the terms of the offering, except for 
notices which direct investors to the funding portal or broker.”  15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(2) 
(2012).  See also Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71425, 71542 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.204) (limiting communication between issuers and potential 
investors to channels provided by the intermediary on the intermediary’s platform). 
148. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71425, 71542 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. § 227.204). 
149. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012).
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[i]n practice, this means that only truly interested parties,
acting of their own volition and not at the urging of paid
salespeople, who are prepared to take time to register with
the funding portal, share personal information, and
undergo investor education, will ever have access to, and
the opportunity to, actually make a crowdfunding
investment.150
However, it should be noted that the SEC has interpreted the 
statutory language quite broadly, suggesting that the “tombstone ads” can 
be placed not only in the newspaper, but on social media as well.151  
Nevertheless, issuers are only permitted to communicate with potential 
investors through the channels provided by the intermediary or the 
intermediary’s platform, which severely inhibits the ability of an issuer 
to sell his or her business offering.152 
In this way, Congress has effectively placed a variety of barriers 
between the issuer and the purchaser, purportedly to protect the consumer 
from potential fraud.153  However, these same barriers that are described 
as consumer protection components also restrict the ability of prospective 
issuers to market their businesses, and ultimately disincentivizes the 
issuer to utilize Title III as their capital raising mechanism.154  Rule 
506(c), which allows a general solicitation of accredited investors, may 
emerge as the preferred method of companies seeking to raise capital, as 
solicitation remains an important component of seeking outside 
investment.155  Notwithstanding the incentives to use Rule 506(c), experts 
have predicted that Rule 506(b) offerings will likely continue to dominate 
the private securities offerings realm because of the economic incentives 
150. Ellenoff, supra note 146, at 25–26 (discussing the requirements of JOBS Act §
302(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)). 
151. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71537, 71425 (Nov. 16, 2015) (“[The SEC] believe[s]
the final rules will allow issuers to leverage social media to attract investors, while at the same 
time protecting investors by limiting the ability of issuers to advertise the terms of the offering 
without directing them to the required disclosure.”). 
152. Id.
153. See Ellenoff, supra note 146, at 25–26 (suggesting that disclosure requirements and
the statutorily-imposed so-called distance between a potential investor and an issuer seeking 
investment will help deter crowdfunding fraud). 
154. Eakin, supra note 17.
155. Robbins, supra note 118.
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associated with the lack of ongoing disclosure and filing requirements in 
addition to industry attorneys’ familiarity with rule’s requirements.156  
Despite Congress’ admirable attempt to expand capital markets to the 
ordinary American investor, the burdens accompanying a Title III 
offering effectively void the advantage of reaching the entire crowd.157 
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE JOBS ACT TO INCREASE
INVESTORS’ ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS IN FULFILLMENT OF THE
JOBS ACT’S INTENDED PURPOSE 
Private issuers need some incentive to deviate from the traditional 
method of raising capital—Regulation D, Rule 506(b) and Rule 506(c).  
The burden on issuers is heavier for Title III than for Regulation D 
offerings.  The SEC has frustrated the purpose of the nine pages of Title 
III within the JOBS Act by promulgating complex, complicated rules 
with many economic roadblocks.158  These roadblocks created by Title 
III drastically reduce the economic efficiency, and thus, the appeal of 
crowdfunding.159  Rather than helping everyday investors by protecting 
them from fraudulent offerings, or educating them about the value of 
private securities, the final rule will ultimately cost ordinary Americans 
the opportunity to participate in private placements due to the numerous, 
daunting hurdles that will prevent issuers from raising capital through 
Title III crowdfunding and intermediaries from facilitating such 
investment.160  The cost of conducting a “mini-IPO” through an online 
funding portal is much more expensive than utilizing any of the 
alternatives, particularly Regulation D.161 
156. See BAUGUESS, ET AL., supra note 37, at 15 (noting the dominance of Rule 506 can
be attributed to the preemption of state securities laws and the SEC’s lesser qualification 
requirements than other rules). 
157. Id.; see also Robbins, supra note 118, at 4–5 (suggesting six reasons why
crowdfunding “is limited in ways that make it far less attractive than Rule 506(c)”). 
158. See Almerico, supra note 132 (“Then, we read the 585 pages of rules and
comments. . . . but surely the SEC would understand that a startup company would need an 
economical way to crowdfund under the JOBS Act.  Apparently, the SEC did not get this 
memo.”). 
159. See Eakin, supra note 17 (“Simply put, if Title III is more expensive and time
consuming than alternative paths to funding, promising entrepreneurs will, and should, avoid 
it, except as an option of last resort.”). 
160. Id.
161. See Mandelbaum, supra note 135 (commenting on the costs of Title III, including
intermediary fees, audit fees, annual reporting costs, and regulatory compliance costs). 
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In order to make Title III offerings more appealing, the cost of 
conducting such an offering must be reduced, particularly for the issuer.  
The requirement of reviewed financial statements for offerings greater 
than $100,000 should be eliminated to reduce the financial burden; rather, 
the submission of an income tax return should suffice for offerings of $1 
million or less.162  This would save a significant amount of money for 
issuers, likely tens of thousands of dollars.163  Moreover, the $1 million 
offering limitation should be lifted to increase the number of businesses 
that might consider Title III as a reasonable means of raising capital.164  
Also, the reporting requirements should be relaxed in order to decrease 
costs associated with qualified Title III offerings.  Although the optional 
“Q&A” format for Form C is a step in the right direction, Form C should 
be further simplified such that an average business owner could complete 
the forms without the involvement of securities counsel, which will 
inevitably be expensive.165  If the cost of an offering under Title III were 
to drop significantly in order to compete with Regulation D, Title III 
would become a viable alternative to other options for raising capital.166 
In passing the JOBS Act, Congress was especially pressed with 
the challenge of balancing the promotion of business growth and 
consumer protection.167  Many have been fraught with concerns that 
crowdfunding will open the door to fraud, as unsophisticated, non-
accredited investors—those with a net worth less than $1 million or an 
income less than $200,000 in the preceding two years—might be able to 
make a risky investment decision without adequate disclosure of all 
162. See Robb Mandelbaum, Should You Crowdfund Your Next Business?, INC.COM (May
2014), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201405/robb-mandelbaum/jobs-act-crowdfunding-
problems.html (“I just don’t see people raising more than half-a-million bucks through Title
III as long as that audit requirement is there,” noted Scott Purcell, CEO of FundAmerica while
discussing the disincentive of the audit requirement for offerings greater than $500,000).
163. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71499–500 (Nov. 16, 2015).
164. Robbins, supra note 118.
165. Id.
166. See Mandelbaum, Should You Crowdfund Your Next Business?, supra note 162
(discussing the many hurdles presented by Title III crowdfunding including: finding the right 
portal with the right price, taking a bet on whether or not the crowd will invest in your 
business, and furthermore, the many costs associated with a Title III offering). 
167. See Thomas Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful 
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1738 (2011–2012) (“Policymakers continually face the 
challenge of effectively balancing the benefits of encouraging small business formation 
against the investor protection goals of the securities laws.”). 
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material information.168  Is it merely a person’s net worth that gauges their 
ability to make an investment decision?  Regardless, proponents of the 
investment limitations imposed by Title III of the JOBS Act169 argue that 
such restrictions ensure adequate consumer protection.170  These 
limitations are reinforced by the disclosure requirements of the JOBS 
Act, particularly Form C, which is sufficiently detailed to allow potential 
investors to make an educated decision.171  Furthermore, the final rule for 
Title III incorporates sufficient measures to prevent fraud, including, but 
not limited to, the prerequisite that funding portals require investors to 
undergo a brief education program via the website.172  In the unfortunate 
circumstance that a fraudulent offering does occur, issuers are liable to 
purchasers under Section 4A(c) of the Securities Act, which triggers the 
identical liability as is created under Section 12(a)(2).173  Section 12(a)(2) 
permits the purchaser of a security the ability to sue the seller if the seller 
omits material facts or misleads the purchaser of a security.174  In this 
respect, the JOBS Act and Title III sacrifice the ability of the average 
American to invest in exchange for investor protection. 
Compared with each of the other methods of raising capital in the 
form of private securities offerings, Regulation D still continues to 
provide the most cost-effective means available.  Because of this, the 
opportunities for the non-accredited, average American to invest are 
considerably limited.  Although the adoption of the Regulation A+ and 
Title III rules is a step in the right direction toward allowing greater public 
participation in investment opportunities, the rules fail to fulfill the 
168. See, e.g., Bryan Sullivan & Stephen Ma, Crowdfunding: Potential Legal Disaster
Waiting to Happen, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/2012/10/22/crowdfunding-potential-legal-disaster-
waiting-to-happen/#58f84df33c9f (“The bottom line is that, while unintentional, 
crowdfunding is tailor made to assist fraudsters in duping unsophisticated ‘investors.’”). 
169. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
170. See Hazen, supra note 167, at 1765 (“It is naïve to assume that limiting offerings to
small amounts per investor will deter scammers from taking advantage of investors via 
crowdfunding.”). 
171. JOBS Act § 302(b)4A(b)(1) (providing for the “Requirements on Issuers” within the
“new” Section 4A of the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(b)(1); Crowdfunding, 
80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71538 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 227.201). 
172. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71543 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 227.302(2)(b)).
173. JOBS Act § 302(b)4A(c) (providing for a cause of action, within the “new” Section
4A, against an issuer who “makes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a 
material fact required to be stated”); 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(c)(1)(B). 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).
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promise of crowdfunding.  Congress should again revisit the JOBS Act 
to remove many of the restrictions imposed by Title III in order to make 
it an attractive capital raising method for small businesses.175  No longer 
should only the wealthy have access to a full range of investment 
opportunities; so too should the crowd. 
MAX E. ISAACSON 
175. See Brian Korn, SEC Proposes Crowdfunding Rules, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013, 2:41
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2013/10/23/sec-proposes-crowdfunding-
rules/ (“Compared to other forms of crowdfunding and capital raising, equity crowdfunding 
to the public has the worst ‘bang for your buck’ in all of corporate finance. . . . In order for 
equity crowdfunding to the public to serve as a useful tool, as intended, Congress needs to 
amend the JOBS Act to make it less onerous and costly.  Unfortunately, the SEC’s hands are 
tied since the JOBS Act itself creates most of the restrictions in the proposed rule.”). 
